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A New Direction for US Climate Policy:
Assessing the First 100 Days of Donald Trump’s Presidency
Michael Mehling*
Following his surprise election, President Trump has translated several campaign promises
into a relentless progression of executive measures. This article traces the first 100 days of
his presidency as they relate to climate and energy policy, assessing the impact of person-
nel choices, his regulatory reform agenda, and his proposed budget blueprint, as well as ex-
ecutive or agency orders across various sectors. It also differentiates between the expected
impact of federal policy choices and fundamental trends in the energy sector as well as the
activist role of states and municipalities in shaping climate policy outcomes. Finally, the ar-
ticle discusses procedural constraints and judicial review as moderating forces, limiting the
scale and speed with which the new president can overturn the climate legacy of his prede-
cessor. In the end, the article argues that a retrospective of recent administrations reveals a
cyclical pattern which both confines and perpetuates the alternating extremes of successive
presidencies.
I. Background
On 20 January 2017, Donald J Trump ascended to the
highest office in the United States (US), the presi-
dency. His surprising victory in the Electoral College
– which portends a major ideological shift in Amer-
ican energy and environmental policy – has been
met with significant concern in the environmental
community both domestically and abroad. During
an acrimonious and controversial election season, he
repeatedly vowed to overturn the climate legacy of
his predecessor, Barack H Obama, citing doubts
about the very existence of climate change1 and ar-
guing that related policy measures were harming the
US economy and destroying jobs. Still, given that he
had at one point expressed support for robust cli-
mate action,2 it initially remained unclear to what
extent the conflicting remarks Trump made during
the campaign would also shape his executive deci-
sions once he assumed office. As the first 100 days
of his presidency come to a close, however, a num-
ber of early policy steps provide a growing body of
evidence for the policy vision of the new adminis-
tration – and this vision is remarkably aligned with
candidate Trump’s campaign rhetoric in recent
years.
Many of the central pillars of this vision can be
traced back to a campaign speech the candidate held
before a an annual petroleum conference in Bismar-
ck, North Dakota, on 26 May 2016. On this occasion,
he outlined the contours of his ‘America First Ener-
gy Plan’, which included immediate steps to rescind
* Michael Mehling, Deputy Director, Center for Energy and Envi-
ronmental Policy Research (CEEPR), Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), Cambridge, Mass; Professor of Practice, School
of Law, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. For correspondence:
<mmehling@mit.edu>.
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1 On 6 November 2012, Donald J Trump famously tweeted: ‘The
concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in
order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive’, followed by
several tweets in 2013 and 2014 describing climate change as a
‘hoax’; on 2 January 2014, he reacted to cold weather by tweet-
ing: ‘This very expensive GLOBAL WARMING bullshit has got to
stop.’
2 See, for instance, a letter addressed to President Barack Obama
and the US Congress printed in the New York Times (6 December
2009) calling for a global climate deal at COP 15, signed by
Donald Trump and three of his children: ‘We support your effort
to ensure meaningful and effective measures to control climate
change, an immediate challenge facing the United States and the
world today.’
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executive actions on climate change, lift restrictions
on fossil fuel extraction, ‘cancel the Paris Climate
Agreement and stop all payments of US tax dollars
to U.N. global warming programs.’3 Likewise, his ap-
pointments to lead the transition at key government
agencies suggested an uncompromising hostility to-
wards environmental safeguards, and to climate pol-
icy in particular.4 Fears that President Trump would
undo years of progress on climate policy received fur-
ther impetus when he announced his designated cab-
inet, with a number of prospective members who
have long ties to the fossil fuel industry or a track
record of opposing government action on climate
change. In the meantime, the cabinet has been con-
firmed, including the following heads of federal de-
partments and agencies with responsibility for cli-
mate policy:
• E Scott Pruitt, the former Attorney General for Ok-
lahoma, as Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). During the presidency
of Barack Obama, Pruitt sued the EPA in over a
dozen cases, repeatedly questioning the scientific
threat and seriousness of climate change and the
need for federal climate action.5 Extensive corre-
spondence released after a court order revealed
close coordination of his office with major oil, gas
and coal producers, electric utilities and other in-
dustry groups.6 Since his appointment, Pruitt has
indicated his intention to promote an agenda of
‘originalism’ at the EPA, reversing ‘regulatory as-
sault’ on industry and devolving authority to the
states.7
• J Richard Perry, former Governor of Texas, as Sec-
retary of Energy. Perry dismissed climate change
and alleged a ‘cooling trend’ in a 2010 book,8 and
once promised to eliminate – but then failed to re-
member the name of – the Department of Energy
(DOE) during a Republican primary debate on 9
November 2011.
• Rex W Tillerson, former Chairman and CEO of
ExxonMobil Corp, as Secretary of State. While
Tillerson himself has affirmed the scientific con-
sensus on climate change and endorsed policy
action, the company he formerly led is under in-
vestigation for potentially misleading con-
sumers and investors about the risks of climate
change.9
• Ryan Zinke, former Navy SEAL and a Member of
the US House of Representatives for Montana, as
Secretary of the Interior, heading a department
with oversight over the use of federal lands, in-
cluding oil, gas and coal extraction. Zinke has wa-
vered in his affirmation of climate change and sup-
port for climate action.10
3 Donald J Trump, ‘An America First Energy Plan’ (26 May 2016)
<http://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/an-america-first
-energy-plan> accessed 29 March 2017. Most of these pledges
are contained in a version uploaded to the website of the White
House, ‘An America First Energy Plan’ <https://www.whitehouse
.gov/america-first-energy> accessed 29 March 2017.
4 Myron Ebell, who led the transition at the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), is the Director of Energy and Environment at
the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI). He is openly a climate-
skeptic, and helped co-author the chapter on energy and environ-
ment in Ivan Osorio and Gregory Conko (eds), Free to Prosper: A
Pro-Growth Agenda for the 115th Congress (CEI 2016), which sets
out ten recommendations to dismantle US domestic and foreign
climate policy. Many of these recommendations were also picked
up by Thomas Pyle, President of the influential Institute for Energy
Research (IER) and its advocacy arm, the American Energy Al-
liance (AEA), who led the transition at the Department of Energy
(DOE) and indicated his policy preferences in a letter to stake-
holders on 15 November 2016, see Nick Surgey, ‘Revealed: The
Trump Administration’s Energy Plan’ (Center for Media and
Democracy, 4 December 2016) <http://www.exposedbycmd.org/
2016/12/04/revealed-trump-energy-plan> accessed 29 March
2017.
5 See eg E Scott Pruitt and Luther Strange, ‘The Climate-Change
Gang’ (National Review, 17 May 2016) <http://www
.nationalreview.com/article/435470/climate-change-attorneys
-general-overstep-their-authority> accessed 29 March 2017. Pruitt
has since been under criticism for suggesting that carbon dioxide
(CO2) is not ‘a primary contributor to the global warming that we
see’, see Tom DiChristopher, ‘EPA Chief Scott Pruitt Says Carbon
Dioxide Is Not a Primary Contributor to Global Warming’ (CNBC,
9 March 2017) <http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/09/epa-chief
-scott-pruitt.html> accessed 29 March 2017.
6 Coral Davenport and Eric Lipton, ‘E.P.A. Chief Was Cozy With
Energy Industry, Trove of Emails Shows’ (New York Times, 23
February 2017) A13.
7 Charlie Spiering, ‘Exclusive: Scott Pruitt Promises ‘EPA Original-
ism’ in Donald Trump Administration’ (Breitbart, 28 March 2017)
<http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/03/28/exclusive
-scott-pruitt-promises-epa-orginalism-in-donald-trump
-administration> accessed 29 March 2017.
8 Rick Perry, Fed Up! Our Fight to Save America from Washington
(Little, Brown & Co 2010) 92.
9 A coalition of State Attorneys General, led by Eric T Schneider-
man of New York and Maura T Healey of Massachusetts, have
formally issued subpoenas and civil investigative demands to
ExxonMobil, see, for instance, Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Office of the Attorney General, ‘Civil Investigative Demand’ (19
April 2016) <http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/energy-utilities/
exxon/ma-exxon-cid-.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017.
10 Chelsea Harvey, ‘Trump’s Pick for Interior Secretary Can’t Seem to
Make Up His Mind About Climate Change’ (Washington Post, 21
December 2016) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy
-environment/wp/2016/12/21/trumps-pick-for-interior-secretary
-cant-seem-to-make-up-his-mind-about-climate-change> ac-
cessed 29 March 2017.
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• Elaine L Chao as Secretary of Transportation, with
partial responsibility for addressing environmen-
tal impacts from the transport sector. Chao was
previously a Distinguished Fellow with the conser-
vative Heritage Foundation, where she drafted a
commentary opposing efforts by the 111th Con-
gress to address climate change.11
• Jefferson B Sessions, a Senator from Alabama,
as Attorney General, an important role in any le-
gal proceedings against regulatory measures of
the current administration, or in enforcing mea-
sures adopted under the previous administra-
tion. Sessions has consistently opposed action
against climate change, repeatedly questioning
its existence and the risks posed by carbon diox-
ide.12
Other members of the cabinet, such as the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services Thomas E
Price,13 or the nominee for Secretary of Agriculture
George E ‘Sonny’ Perdue,14 have also openly ques-
tioned the science of climate change and opposed
any related policy action. An unusual number of
lower level appointments have remained vacant two
months after the inauguration,15 impeding the abil-
ity of many agencies to work effectively; yet where
positions have been filled, the foregoing pattern of
hostility against climate action is perpetuated, for
instance at the EPA, where several senior positions
have been filled with candidates who expressly
question or deny the scientific consensus on climate
change.16
Less than 100 days into the new presidency, the
White House has already mandated a review or
rescission of several federal climate policies. Few of
these orders have immediate effect, however, requir-
ing observance of lengthy administrative proce-
dures which, in turn, will be vulnerable to litigation
by states and environmental advocacy groups. It al-
so remains unclear whether executive action can
halt or reverse dynamics that are primarily driven
by state and local policies and market fundamen-
tals. Whether or not President Trump can, thus, use
a reversal of climate policy progress under his pre-
decessor to advance his declared objective of decon-
structing the ‘administrative state’, as his Chief
Strategist Stephen K Bannon has framed it,17 re-
mains to be seen. All the main actions taken by the
administration since the inauguration are described
in the following section, and the impacts they are
likely to have are then discussed in a concluding sec-
tion.
II. Actions by the Administration and
115th Congress
1. Regulatory Reform
An early harbinger of the regulatory reform agenda
of the new administration was promptly unveiled on
inauguration day, when the White House Chief of
Staff Reinhold R Priebus issued a memorandum to
all agencies ordering a regulatory freeze and requir-
11 Elaine Chao, ‘A Return to Prosperity is Light-Years Away if We
Follow Obama's Road Map’ (4 September 2009) <http://www
.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/commentary/return-prosperity
-light-years-away-if-we-follow-obamas-road-map> accessed 29
March 2017.
12 In a Senate hearing with former EPA Administrator Regina Mc-
Carthy, Sessions implied that ‘[c]arbon pollution is CO2, and
that’s really not a pollutant; that’s a plant food, and it doesn’t
harm anybody’, see US Senate, Committee on Environment &
Public Works (EPW), ‘Environment Oversight Hearing: Examining
the President’s Budget Request for the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency’ 50-1 (4 March 2015) <http://www.epw.senate.gov/
public/_cache/files/1dc249c2-7677-47f6-b33a-5c241105fa7e/
spw030415.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017.
13 Price, previously a Representative for Georgia, signed a pledge to
oppose carbon pricing (‘No Climate Tax Pledge’) spearheaded by
Americans for Prosperity, see ‘Pledge Takers’ <http://
noclimatetax.com/pledge-takers> accessed 29 March 2017; he
also supported legislation to curb EPA carbon emission con-
straints by claiming ‘many revelations of errors and obfuscation
in the allegedly “settled science” of global warming’, see ‘Repub-
licans Continue to Fight National Energy Tax’ (2 March 2010)
<http://votesmart.org/public-statement/490191/republicans
-continue-to-fight-national-energy-tax> accessed 29 March
2017.
14 Perdue, the former Governor of Georgia, wrote a commentary in
the National Review challenging any connection between climate
change and extreme weather events, and calling climate change
‘a running joke among the public’: Sonny Perdue, ‘The Common
Core Blame Game’ (National Review, 8 May 2014) <http://www
.nationalreview.com/article/377495/common-core-blame-game
-sonny-perdue> accessed 29 March 2017.
15 Partnership for Public Service, ‘Political Appointee Tracker’
(2017) <http://ourpublicservice.org/issues/presidential
-transition/political-appointee-tracker.php> accessed 29 March
2017.
16 Coral Davenport, ‘New Administrator Stacks E.P.A. With Climate
Change Skeptics’ (New York Times, 8 March 2017) A17.
17 Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, ‘Bannon Presses “Deconstruc-
tion”’ Washington Post (24 February 2017), A1.
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ing all new or pending regulations – broadly defined
to include any regulatory action or guidance docu-
ments that set forth ‘a policy on a statutory, regula-
tory, or technical issue or an interpretation’ thereof
– to obtain approval from a political appointee of the
new administration.18 Among the rules affected by
this memorandum are a number of energy efficien-
cy and renewable fuel standards, along with several
dozen other rules issued by the EPA and DOE during
the last months of the previous administration.19
President Trump soon after signed an Executive Or-
der requiring federal agencies to repeal at least two
existing regulations for every newly issued regula-
tion, and to do so in a way that ensures the total cost
of regulations does not increase.20 A subsequent Ex-
ecutive Order ensures observance of this agenda by
establishing a Regulatory Reform Officer and Task
Force in each agency.21 Although these orders raise
many questions and their legality is already being
disputed,22 they signal a strong commitment of the
new administration to unraveling the framework of
executive rules and interpretations iterated over the
years by previous administrations.
2. Federal Budget
In March, two months into the presidency of Donald
Trump, the White House released its budget blue-
print for 2018.23 With an emphasis on national secu-
rity and public safety, the budget blueprint proposes
significant increases in defense spending, homeland
security and law enforcement as ‘a message of Amer-
ican strength, security, and resolve.’24 Extensive cut-
backs to unrelated agencies and programmes would
maintain budget neutrality and avoid increasing na-
tional debt. Among the agencies hit hardest by pro-
posed expenditure cuts are the three agencies with
substantial responsibilities for climate change: the
EPA, the DOE and the Department of State. Specifi-
cally, the blueprint proposes the following budgetary
changes:
• Under the budget blueprint, the EPA would see
its 2018 budget shrink by 31.4% to $5.7 billion,25
the largest cut in relative terms to any federal
agency, and a significantly larger cut than re-
quested by Congressional Republicans.26 In par-
ticular, the blueprint discontinues ‘funding for
the Clean Power Plan, international climate
change programs, climate change research and
partnership programs, and related efforts,’ con-
sistent with the ‘America First Energy Plan’
pledged during the campaign and the ‘priority to
ease the burden of unnecessary Federal regula-
tions’ expressed in the budget itself.27 Among the
envisioned cuts are 224 staff and 14 voluntary
programmes under the Climate Protection Pro-
gramme, including the popular ‘Energy Star’ la-
18 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Memorandum for the
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies’ (20 January 2017)
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/20/
memorandum-heads-executive-departments-and-agencies> ac-
cessed 29 March 2017.
19 See, for instance, the list compiled by the EPA, ‘Delay of Effec-
tive Date for 30 Final Regulations Published by the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency Between October 28, 2016 and January
17, 2017’ of 26 January 2017 (2017) 82 (16) Federal Register
8499.
20 Executive Order 13771, ‘Reducing Regulation and Controlling
Regulatory Costs’ of 30 January 2017 (2017) 82(22) Federal
Register 9339.
21 Executive Order 13777, ‘Enforcing the Regulatory Reform
Agenda’ of 24 February 2017 (2017) 82(39) Federal Register
12285.
22 Arguing that this order would prevent agencies from complying
with statutory requirements, Michael Burger and Jessica Wentz,
‘Trump’s Executive Order On Regulatory Costs Undermines
Congressional Authority’ (Huffington Post, 16 February 2017)
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trumps-executive-order
-on-regulatory-costs-undermines-congressional-authority_us
_58a61a0de4b037d17d26215c> accessed 29 March 2017.
See generally Marcus Peacock, ‘Implementing a Two-for-One
Regulatory Requirement in the U.S.’ (George Washington Univer-
sity Regulatory Studies Center, 7 December 2016) <http://
regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/regulatorystudies
.columbian.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Peacock_Implementing
-Two-For-One%2012-2016_final.pdf> accessed on 29 March
2017. On 8 February 2017, three advocacy groups filed a com-
plaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against Executive
Order 13771, alleging multiple violations of statutory law:
Public Citizen Inc. et al v Donald Trump et al, US District Court
for the District of Columbia, Case 1:17-cv-00253 [8 February
2017].
23 Executive Office of the United States, Office of Management and
Budget, ‘America First: A Budget Blueprint to Make America
Great Again’ (16 March 2017) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/2018_blueprint.pdf
> accessed 29 March 2017.
24 ibid 1.
25 ibid 41.
26 See the critical assessment by former EPA Administrator Chris-
tine Todd Whitman, ‘I Ran George W. Bush’s EPA—and Trump’s
Cuts to the Agency Would Endanger Lives’ (The Atlantic, 31
March 2017) <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2017/03/trumps-epa-cuts-budget/521223> accessed 31 March
2017.
27 Executive Office (n 23) 41.
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beling standard for energy efficient consumer
products, which would be completely eliminat-
ed.28
• For the DOE, the budget blueprint requests $28.0
billion, a 5.6% decrease. Because this includes a
substantial budget increase for the National Nu-
clear Security Administration, however, all re-
maining programmes – including the Office of En-
ergy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE), or
the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy
(ARPA-E) – will effectively see an aggregate 17.9%
decrease in funding. Additionally, the budget blue-
print announces ‘an increased reliance on the pri-
vate sector to fund later-stage research, develop-
ment, and commercialization of energy technolo-
gies.’29
• Extensive cuts are also requested for the Depart-
ment of State and associated international pro-
grammes,30 which together would see their bud-
get reduced by 28% to $25.6 billion. Citing the
need to achieve an ‘appropriate U.S. share of in-
ternational spending’ and ‘reduce or end direct
funding for international organizations whose
missions do not substantially advance U.S. foreign
policy interests’, the budget proposes to eliminate
‘the Global Climate Change Initiative and … cease
payments to the United Nations’ (UN) climate
change programs.’31 Likewise, it anticipates cuts
to US funding for multilateral development
banks, including the World Bank, by approxi-
mately $650 million over three years compared to
commitments made by the previous administra-
tion.32
• Other relevant areas threatened with dramatic
spending cuts are the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA) at the Depart-
ment of Commerce33 and subsidies for long dis-
tance train services through the Department of
Transportation (DOT),34 while the Department
of the Interior (DOI) would see an increase in
funding for programmes that support develop-
ment of energy on public lands and offshore wa-
ters.35
In addition to the foregoing cuts for 2018, the White
House has requested Congress to reduce spending
for energy and environmental programs for the cur-
rent fiscal year, after the Continuing Resolution
that is currently preventing a government shut-
down expires. Proposed on 24 March 2017, these re-
quests include steep cuts of more than $650 mil-
lion to the budgets of ARPA-E and EERE at the DOE,
which would effectively eliminate a number of
grants and rescind unobligated spending for com-
mercialisation of clean energy technologies.36 Im-
portantly, these proposals and the budget blueprint
are only an indication of the priorities of the ad-
ministration, outlining discretionary funding pro-
posals; both the requested changes for 2017 and a
full budget request for 2018 – expected sometime
in May – will have to pass Congress, where they are
likely to undergo significant change. Given the
magnitude and focus of the spending cutbacks,
however, they leave little doubt about the adminis-
tration’s expressed objective of ‘focusing funding
to redefine the proper role of the Federal Govern-
ment.’37
3. Transportation Sector
In 2016, after years of falling greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions from electricity generation, the trans-
portation sector became the single largest source of
emissions in the US.38 It also became the first target
of executive climate action during the administra-
tion of President Obama, when the EPA and the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) drew on rulemaking authorities under the
28 See David A Bloom, Acting Chief Financial Officer, EPA, ‘Memo-
randum: FY 2018 President’s Budget: Major Policy and Final
Resource Decisions’ (21 March 2017), on file with author.
29 Executive Office (n 23) 19.
30 These include the US Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the International Programmes at the Department of
the Treasury, ibid 33.
31 Specifically, the budget blueprint eliminates all US funding
related to the Green Climate Fund and precursor climate invest-
ment funds, see Executive Office (n 23) 33.
32 ibid 33.
33 ibid 13.
34 ibid 35.
35 ibid 27.
36 George Cahlink, ‘White House Outlines More Cuts for Energy,
Environment’ (E&E News, 28 March 2017) <http://www.eenews
.net/greenwire/stories/1060052208> accessed 29 March 2017.
37 Executive Office (n 23) 5.
38 Energy Information Administration (EIA), ‘Monthly Energy Review
March 2017’ 184-5 (28 March 2017) <https://www.eia.gov/
totalenergy/data/monthly/archive/00351703.pdf> accessed 29
March 2017.
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Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA)39 and
the Clean Air Act40 to issue joint Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) and GHG emissions standards
for passenger cars and light trucks manufactured be-
tween 2012 and 2016.41 A second phase would re-
quire passenger cars and light trucks manufactured
between 2017 and 2025 to achieve a fleet average of
54.5 miles per gallon by 2025,42 contributing to a pro-
jected reduction of tailpipe GHG emissions by 2 bil-
lion metric tons over the lifetime of vehicles sold dur-
ing that period.43 Less than two months after the in-
auguration of President Trump, on 15 March 2017,
the new administration announced that it would re-
instate a midterm evaluation of the standards,44 sig-
naling its intention to review whether these are ex-
cessively burdensome relative to the GHG emissions
reductions and fuel savings they would achieve.45
The outgoing administration had cut short the
midterm evaluation process just days before the tran-
sition with a determination concluding that no
changes to the second phase covering model years
2017 to 2025 were warranted.46 A new determination
is expected by 1 April 2018, and observers predict
that the standards will be ‘substantially relaxed’ in
view of a changing vehicle fleet following a period
of low gasoline prices.47 All standards were at one
point agreed with vehicle manufacturers during ear-
lier stakeholder consultations, but have come under
increasing pressure with fears of growing compli-
ance costs. It remains unclear whether similar stan-
dards for medium and heavy duty vehicles produced
between 2018 and 2029 will also be reviewed.48 Like-
wise, there is no indication as yet that the EPA would
rescind a waiver issued under Section 209 of the
Clean Air Act, allowing California – and, pursuant to
Section 177, any other states willing to follow the Cal-
ifornian lead – to adopt stricter standards within
their territory; because vehicle manufacturers tend
to uniformly adhere to the more ambitious Californ-
ian standards rather than design different vehicle
models for uneven environmental standards across
the United States, a weakening of federal tailpipe
emission standards may have limited effect only, un-
less the EPA moves to reverse a previously granted
waiver or Congress amends its legal basis in the Clean
Air Act.
39 94th Congress, S622 (22 December 1975), Pub. L. 94-163, 89
Stat. 871, as amended by the Energy Independence and Security
Act (EISA), 110th Congress, HR 6 (19 December 2007), 42 US
Code Chapter 152 § 17001.
40 88th Congress, HR 6518, ‘An Act to Improve, Strengthen, and
Accelerate Programs for the Prevention and Abatement of Air
Pollution (Clean Air Act)’ (17 December 1963), as amended in
1967, 1970 and 1990, 42 US Code Chapter 85 § 7401. In 2007,
the US Supreme Court had determined in Massachusetts v Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency et al [2 April 2007] 549 US 497
(2007) that the EPA shall regulate GHG emissions if it concludes
that, by causing or contributing to climate change, these GHGs
endanger both public health and the public welfare of current
and future generations. Late in 2009, the EPA issued such a
finding, see ‘Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for
Greenhouse Gases under the Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act’,
of 7 December 2009, 40 CFR Chapter I (2009) 74(239) Federal
Register 66496.
41 In this first phase, new vehicles sold in 2016 are mandated to
achieve an average fuel efficiency of 35.5 miles per gallon by
2016, based on a CAFE standard of 34.1 miles per gallon and a
GHG emissions limit of 250 grams per mile, see DOT NHTSA
and EPA, ‘Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards
and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule’ of 1
April 2010, 40 CFR Parts 85, 86, and 600 (2010) 75(88) Federal
Register 25324. These standards are projected to save 61.0 billion
gallons of fuel and reduce GHG emissions by 654.7 million
metric tons over the lifetimes of the sold vehicles, see National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, ‘Fact Sheet: NHTSA and
EPA Establish New National Program to Improve Fuel Economy
and Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions for Passenger Cars and
Light Trucks’ (no date given) 5 <https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa
.dot.gov/files/cafe-ghg_fact_sheet.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017.
42 Equaling an average industry level of approximately 163
grams/mile of CO2 in model year 2025, see DOT NHTSA and
EPA, ‘Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards
for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles: Phase 2;
Final Rule’ of 16 August 2016, 40 CFR Parts 9, 22, 85, 86, 600,
1033, 1036, 1037, 1039, 1042, 1043, 1065, 1066, and 1068, 49
CFR Parts 523, 534, 535, and 538 (2016) 81(206) Federal Register
73478.
43 EPA Office of Transportation and Air Quality, ‘Regulatory An-
nouncement EPA-420-F-12-05’ (1 August 2012) <https://nepis.epa
.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100EZ7C.PDF?Dockey=P100EZ7C.PDF>
accessed 29 March 2017.
44 Department of Transportation (DOT) and EPA, ‘Notice of Inten-
tion To Reconsider the Final Determination of the Mid-Term
Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model
Year 2022–2025 Light Duty Vehicles’ of 3 March 2017 (2017)
82(54) Federal Register 14671.
45 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Release of 15
March 2017 <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/
03/15/president-donald-j-trump-buy-american-and-hire-american
-united-states> accessed 29 March 2017.
46 EPA, ‘Final Determination on the Appropriateness of the Model
Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards under the Midterm Evaluation’ (12 January 2017)
<https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-01/documents/
420r17001.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017.
47 Jason P Britt, ‘President Trump Orders EPA Review of Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards’ (Dashboard Insights, 20 March
2017) <https://www.autoindustrylawblog.com/2017/03/20/
president-trump-orders-epa-review-of-corporate-average-fuel
-economy-standards> accessed 29 March 2017.
48 DOT NHTSA and EPA, ‘Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel
Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and
Vehicles: Phase 2’ of 16 August 2016, 40 CFR Parts 9, 22, 85, 86,
600, 1033, 1036, 1037, 1039, 1042, 1043, 1065, 1066, and
1068, 49 CFR Parts 523, 534, 535, and 538 (2016) 81(206)
Federal Register 73478. The agencies estimate that these stan-
dards will save up to 2 billion barrels of oil and reduce CO2
emissions by up to 1.1 billion metric tons over the lifetimes of
new vehicles sold between 2018 and 2029.
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4. Energy Sector
Several measures adopted at the outset of the new ad-
ministration share one central objective: to reduce the
regulatory burden on oil, gas and coal production. Col-
lectively, they recalibrate the balance of environmen-
tal and economic interests in the energy sector, as re-
peatedly pledged during the election campaign. Al-
ready in February, the Interior Department suspend-
ed49 and then, in April, formally proposed repealing50
a revised accounting system to govern how oil and gas
produced from federal leases is valued.51 Reforming
the valuation methodology was expected to increase
royalty payments by ensuring that revenue collection
for federal mineral resources is based on fair market
value.52 President Trump took another step towards
regulatory reform in March, when he signed an Exec-
utive Order directing the EPA and the US Army Corps
of Engineers (ACE) to revisit a federal rule53 that de-
fines the phrase ‘Waters of the United States’
(WOTUS) in the Clean Water Act (CWA).54 By narrow-
ing the scope of federal safeguards for surface waters,
this review will primarily benefit the agricultural sec-
tor, but will also lessen the permitting and compliance
requirements for coal mining and oil and gas produc-
tion. Finally, less than a month after inauguration, Con-
gress exercised a provision under the Congressional
Review Act (CRA)55 for the expedited reversal of a rule
protecting surface water, groundwater, fish, wildlife
and other natural resources from surface coal mining
debris, the ‘Stream Protection Rule.’56 This rule had
been issued during the last weeks of the previous ad-
ministration57 to clarify a statutory obligation requir-
ing mining companies to avoid ‘material damage to
theextent technologicallyandeconomically feasible.’58
On infrastructure, the new administration ap-
proved two controversial projects, the Keystone XL
and the Dakota Access pipelines, after ordering an
expedited authorisation process within days of the
inauguration.59 An easement from the ACE enabled
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline, which
connects oil producers in the North Dakota Bakken
and Three Forks areas to an oil terminal hub in Illi-
nois.60 A decision by the Secretary of the Army to
proceed without an environmental impact statement
under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), as previously intended,61 allowed the ease-
ment to be granted already on 8 February 2017. On
24 March 2017, construction and operation of Key-
stone XL, a pipeline designed to transport synthetic
crude oil and diluted bitumen from Canadian oil sand
facilities through the US Midwest to ports in the Gulf
of Mexico, was approved with a Presidential Permit
issued by the Department of State.62 Unlike the ear-
49 Department of the Interior, Office of Natural Resources Revenue,
‘Postponement of Effectiveness of the Consolidated Federal Oil &
Gas and Federal & Indian Coal Valuation Reform 2017 Valuation
Rule’ of 22 February 2017, 30 CFR Parts 1202 and 1206 (2017)
82(37) Federal Register 11823.
50 Department of the Interior, Office of Natural Resources Revenue,
‘Repeal of Consolidated Federal Oil & Gas and Federal & Indian
Coal Valuation Reform’ of 4 April 2017, 30 CFR Parts 1202 and
1206 (2017) 82(63) Federal Register 16323.
51 Department of the Interior, Office of Natural Resources Revenue,
‘Consolidated Federal Oil & Gas and Federal & Indian Coal
Valuation Reform’ of 1 July 2016, 30 CFR Parts 1202 and 1206
(2016) 81(127) Federal Register 43338.
52 This change in value accounting would have prevented artificially
low royalty payments through a leaseholder practice of initially
selling mined products to affiliated companies at prices below fair
market value before selling on international markets.
53 ACE and EPA, ‘Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the
United States”’ of 29 June 2015 (2015) 80(124) Federal Register
37054.
54 Executive Order 13778, ‘Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism,
and Economic Growth by Reviewing the “Waters of the United
States” Rule’ of 28 February 2017 (2017), 82(41) Federal Register
12497.
55 104th Congress, HR 3136, ‘Contract with America Advancement
Act of 1996’ (28 March 1996) Pub L 104–121, Sec 251: Congres-
sional Review of Agency Rulemaking, US Code Title 5 Part I
Chapter 8.
56 Department of the Interior, Office of Surface Mining Reclamation
and Enforcement (OSMRE), ‘Stream Protection Rule’ (20 Decem-
ber 2016) 81(244) Federal Register 93066.
57 115th Congress HJRes38, ‘Joint Resolution Disapproving the Rule
Submitted by the Department of the Interior Known as the Stream
Protection Rule’ (16 February 2017), Public Law 115-5.
58 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) (3 August
1977) 30 USC §§ 1201–1328, § 1266(b)(1).
59 White House, ‘Presidential Memorandum Regarding Construction
of the Dakota Access Pipeline’ (24 January 2017) <https://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/24/presidential
-memorandum-regarding-construction-dakota-access-pipeline>
accessed 29 March 2017; White House, ‘Presidential Memoran-
dum Regarding Construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline’ (24
January 2017) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2017/01/24/presidential-memorandum-regarding-construction
-keystone-xl-pipeline> accessed 29 March 2017.
60 ACE, ‘Corps Grants Easement to Dakota Access, LLC’ (8 February
2017) <http://www.nwo.usace.army.mil/Media/News-Releases/
Article/1077134/corps-grants-easement-to-dakota-access-llc> ac-
cessed 29 March 2017.
61 Department of Defense, Department of the Army, ‘Notice of
Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement in Connec-
tion With Dakota Access, LLC’s Request for an Easement To Cross
Lake Oahe, North Dakota’ of 17 January 2017 (2017) 82(11)
Federal Register 5543.
62 Department of State, ‘Issuance of Presidential Permit to TransCana-
da for Keystone XL Pipeline’ (24 March 2017) <https://www.state
.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/03/269074.htm> accessed 29 March 2017.
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lier pipeline approval, this decision builds on exten-
sive environmental reviews, yet both pipeline
projects remain highly politicised due to their poten-
tial impacts on water resources and the climate, as
well as alleged violations of indigenous and tribal
rights. Litigation against the approval decisions is al-
ready underway.63
Additional directives relevant to the energy sector,
affecting restrictions on coal, oil and gas production
on federal lands as well as curbs on methane emis-
sions from hydrocarbon activities, were included in
a sweeping Executive Order released in late March
2017. Because this Executive Order primarily aims at
rolling back a body of rules issued in recent years to
address climate change, but also sets out some over-
arching principles and procedures, the constituent
provisions will be discussed in concert in the follow-
ing section.
5. Climate Change
While each of the foregoing actions has ramifications
for US energy and environmental policy, an Execu-
tive Order signed on 28 March 201764 is arguably the
single measure most directly aimed at overturning
the regulatory legacy on climate change left by the
previous administration. Adoption of this order had
been repeatedly postponed due to the political set-
backs around health care legislation and scrutiny of
foreign ties within the administration.65 Titled ‘Pro-
moting Energy Independence and Economic
Growth’, the order expressly identifies as its objec-
tive ‘to promote clean and safe development of … en-
ergy resources’ while ‘avoiding regulatory burdens
that unnecessarily encumber energy production,
constrain economic growth, and prevent job cre-
ation.’66 During the signature ceremony, President
Trump described its aims in more provocative terms
as ‘putting an end to the war on coal’ and ‘ending the
theft of American prosperity.’67 Although it was
greeted with approval by parts of the private sector
and several states with interests in conventional en-
ergy, the Executive Order has also invited heavy crit-
icism from Democrats in Congress as well as the en-
vironmental community. Commentators in progres-
sive media outlets have derided it as ‘unfortunate and
misguided’68 and ‘an angry reflex in search of an
idea.’69
In terms of substance, the Executive Order con-
sists of a number of directives to executive depart-
ments and agencies aimed at suspending, revising,
or rescinding regulations that ‘unduly burden the de-
velopment of domestic energy resources beyond the
degree necessary to protect the public interest or oth-
erwise comply with the law’.70 It goes on to detail a
process requiring agencies to immediately review
and identify ‘all existing regulations, orders, guid-
ance documents, policies, and any other similar
agency actions that potentially burden the develop-
ment or use of domestically produced energy re-
sources, with particular attention to oil, natural gas,
coal, and nuclear energy resources’, and solicits each
agency to submit within specified timelines a plan
for this review as well as, subsequently, a report de-
scribing recommended actions.71 Additional provi-
63 See, eg, Northern Plains Resource Council et al v Department of
State et al, Complaint for Declarative and Injunctive Relief filed
with the US District Court for the District of Montana, Great Falls
Division [30 March 2017] <http://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www
.sierraclub.org/files/blog/Complaint%20filed%202017%2003
%2030.pdf> accessed 31 March 2017.
64 Executive Order 13783 of 28 March 2017, ‘Promoting Energy
Independence and Economic Growth’ (2017) 82(61) Federal
Register 16093.
65 See, eg, Hannah Hess, ‘Executive Order Coming Next Week’
(Greenwire, 1 March 2017); Robin Bravender, ‘Executive Order
Coming as Early as Tomorrow’ (Greenwire, 6 March 2017); Robin
Bravender, ‘Trump Order Now “Unlikely” This Week’ (Greenwire, 8
March 2017); Robin Bravender, ‘Order to Repeal Obama Climate
Rule Expected Tomorrow’ (E&E Daily, 13 March 2017); Robin
Bravender, ‘Waiting Game Continues for Clean Power Plan Order’
(Greenwire, 14 March 2017); Kevin Bogardus, ‘Pruitt Promises
Clean Power Plan Rollback Tomorrow’ (E&E Daily, 27 March 2017).
66 Executive Order 13783 (n 64) s 1(a).
67 White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump at Signing of Execu-
tive Order to Create Energy Independence’ (28 March 2017)
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/28/
remarks-president-trump-signing-executive-order-create-energy>
accessed 30 March 2017.
68 Michael J Bloomberg, ‘Climate Progress, Without Trump’ (New
York Times, 31 March 2017) A23.
69 Jonathan Chait, ‘Trump’s Mindless War on Green Energy’ (New
York Magazine, 28 March 2017) <http://nymag.com/daily/
intelligencer/2017/03/trumps-mindless-war-on-green-energy.html
> accessed 30 March 2017. Chait goes on to describe the order
as an ‘ultimately doomed effort’ by the Republican party ‘to
ignore a problem with which their dogma cannot grapple.’
70 Executive Order 13783 (n 64) s 1(c).
71 Executive Order 13783 (n 64) s 2. Under that provision, Agencies
have 45 days to develop and submit a plan to carry out the
review, 120 days to submit a draft report, and 180 days to submit
a final report.
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sions throughout the Executive Order direct agency
heads to review or withdraw a number of specific ac-
tions. Environmental concerns are only mentioned
incidentally in all this, with the promotion of ‘clean
air and clean water’ acknowledged as a policy objec-
tive, but only ‘to the extent permitted by law’ and
‘while also respecting the proper roles of the Con-
gress and the States concerning these matters.’72 Iron-
ically, while the political intent of the order is to roll
back climate policy measures of the previous admin-
istration, the word ‘climate’ is only mentioned in the
context of the regulations and reports to be rescind-
ed.
At the heart of the Executive Order are provisions
to reverse the Clean Power Plan, a controversial reg-
ulation adopted during the previous administration
to limit GHG emissions from existing power
plants.73 Its importance to former President Oba-
ma’s regulatory strategy on climate change is reflect-
ed in his statement during the announcement cere-
mony that the Clean Power Plan was ‘the single most
important step that America has ever made in the
fight against global climate change’74 – a statement
that stands in stark contrast to President Trump’s as-
sessment during the release of his Executive Order
that ‘[p]erhaps no single regulation threatens our
miners, energy workers, and companies more than
this crushing attack on American industry.’75 Under
the Clean Power Plan, GHG emissions from the pow-
er sector are mandated to fall 32% below 2005 lev-
els by 2030, with goals for individual states based on
interim and final emissions performance rates for
thermal electric generating units.76Years of outreach
and public engagement shaped this complex rule,
which is entirely based on an authorization to regu-
late emissions from existing facilities in Section
111(d) of the Clean Air Act.77 A separate regulation
defining performance standards for new, modified
or reconstructed power plants based on Section
111(b) of the Clean Air Act was issued at the same
time as the Clean Power Plan.78 Both are included in
the revocation mandate contained in the Executive
Order, which directs the EPA to ‘immediately take
all steps necessary to review’ the regulations and any
related rules and guidance for consistency with the
general objective of ‘avoiding regulatory burdens’,
and based upon the review, ‘if appropriate’ and ‘as
soon as practicable’, to ‘suspend, revise, or rescind
the guidance, or publish for notice and comment pro-
posed rules suspending, revising, or rescinding
those rules.’79 On the day the Executive Order was
issued, the EPA began implementing it by withdraw-
ing two proposed rules that were aimed at supple-
menting the Clean Power Plan80 and filing a motion
with the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit to
hold litigation against the rule in abeyance pending
administrative action.81 On the same day, the EPA
filed a notice that it is reviewing and, if appropriate,
72 Executive Order 13783 (n 64) s 1(d).
73 EPA, ‘Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Station-
ary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units; Final Rule’ of 3
August 2015, 40 CFR Part 60 (2015) 80(205) Federal Register
64661.
74 White House, ‘Remarks by the President in Announcing the
Clean Power Plan’ (3 August 2015) <https://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/03/remarks-president
-announcing-clean-power-plan> accessed 29 March 2017.
75 White House (n 67).
76 These performance rates, which are broken down by coal- and
oil-fired electric steam generating units and natural gas-fired
combined cycle generating units, should reflect the ‘best system
of emissions reduction’ (BSER) and be achievable through vari-
ous ‘building blocks’, that is, strategies, technologies and mea-
sures available to reduce the carbon intensity of electricity gener-
ation, such as improving the heat rates in power plants and
substituting coal with natural gas or renewable energy technolo-
gies.
77 Clean Air Act (n 40) s 111(d).
78 EPA, ‘Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
From New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units; Final Rule’ of 3 August 2015, 40
CFR Parts 60, 70, 71, and 98 (2015) 80(205) Federal Register
64510. As with the Clean Power Plan, these New Source Perfor-
mance Standards (NSPS) reflect the degree of emission limitation
achievable through the application of the best system of emission
reduction (BSER), but apply uniformly across the US, with a
mandated rate of 1,000 lbs. of CO2 per MWh for stationary
combustion turbines, generally firing natural gas; and a rate of
1,400 lbs. of CO2 per MWh for electric utility steam generating
units, generally firing coal, a rate that would only be achievable
using Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) technology.
79 Executive Order 13783 (n 64) s 4.
80 EPA, ‘Withdrawal of Proposed Rules: Federal Plan Requirements
for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Electric Utility Generating
Units Constructed on or Before January 8, 2014; Model Trading
Rules; Amendments to Framework Regulations; and Clean Energy
Incentive Program Design Details’ of 28 March 2017, 40 CFR Part
60 (2017) 82(62) Federal Register 16144; idem, ‘Review of the
Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From
New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric
Generating Units’ of 4 April 2017, 40 CFR Part 60 (2017) 82(63)
Federal Register 16330.
81 US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, State of West Virginia, et
al, v EPA, et al, No 15-1363 (and consolidated cases), ‘Notice of
Executive Order, EPA Review of Clean Power Plan and Forthcom-
ing Rulemaking, and Motion to Hold Cases in Abeyance’ (28
March 2017); for more details, see infra, Section III.1.
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will initiate proceedings to suspend, revise or rescind
the Clean Power Plan and new source performance
standards.82
Additionally, the Executive Order mandates a re-
view of rules aimed at reducing methane emissions
from oil and gas operations and, if appropriate, their
rescission or amendment. A series of related rules
was issued by the previous administration as part of
President Obama’s ‘Strategy to Reduce Methane
Emissions’ and the objective of reducing methane
emissions from the oil and gas sector by 40 to 45%
below 2012 levels by 2025.83 Methane, the main con-
stituent of natural gas, has a significantly higher
global warming potential than carbon dioxide, and
its share in US GHG emissions is rising due to in-
creased emissions from oil production as well as the
production, processing, transmission and storage of
natural gas.84 Among the regulations affected by the
Executive Order is a rule that sets out performance
standards for new, modified and reconstructed facil-
ities in the oil and gas sector, defining best practices
for monitoring and detecting leaks, preventing emis-
sions and capturing fugitive gas.85 In early April, the
EPA published a notice announcing that it is review-
ing and, if appropriate, will initiate proceedings to
suspend, revise or rescind that rule.86 Earlier in the
year, the EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards had already withdrawn an Information
Collection Request (ICR) for methane emissions
from the oil and gas industry, part of efforts by the
previous administration to develop standards for
natural gas leakage and flaring from existing facili-
ties.87 A second regulation explicitly mentioned in
the Executive Order seeks to curb methane waste
from oil and natural gas development on federal
land, and specifies limitations on gas flaring, im-
proved leak detection and capture, and venting re-
quirements.88 To date, the administration has not is-
sued a notice announcing a review of this rule, but
on 3 February 2017, the House of Representatives
passed a resolution to repeal it using the CRA.89 A
corresponding Senate resolution is still required be-
fore the disapproval can be submitted to the Presi-
dent for signature.
With the Executive Order, the new administration
is also targeting executive and agency actions re-
stricting the production of coal, oil, natural gas and
shale energy. In particular, it instructs the Secretary
of the Interior to amend or withdraw a Secretarial
Order issued under the previous administration
which called for a programmatic environmental re-
view and modernisation of the federal coal leasing
programme, and imposed a moratorium on federal
land coal leasing based thereon.90 As of 2014, the Bu-
reau of Land Management (BLM) administered coal
leases on 475,692 acres of federal land, supplying ap-
proximately 40% of coal produced in the US. Con-
cerns about fair return on these leases, the climate
impacts of coal use, and deteriorating market condi-
tions had prompted the previous administration to
call for a comprehensive review of the federal coal
leasing programme. Within a day after the Executive
Order was signed by President Trump, Secretary of
the Interior Ryan Zinke signed a Secretarial Order
revoking the moratorium on federal coal leasing as
well as the programmatic environmental review of
82 EPA, ‘Review of the Clean Power Plan’ of 4 April 2017, 40 CFR
Part 60 (2017) 82(63) Federal Register 16329; the draft notice was
filed on 28 March 2017, but published in the Federal Register one
week later.
83 White House, ‘Climate Action Plan: Strategy to Reduce Methane
Emissions’ (12 May 2016) <https://obamawhitehouse.archives
.gov/sites/default/files/strategy_to_reduce_methane_emissions
_2014-03-28_final.pdf> accessed 27 March 2017.
84 EPA, ‘Fact Sheet: EPA’s Actions to Reduce Methane Emissions
from the Oil and Natural Gas Industry: Final Rules and Draft
Information Collection Request’ 1 (2016) <http://www.epa.gov/
sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/nsps-overview-fs.pdf>
accessed 29 March 2017.
85 EPA, ‘Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New,
Reconstructed, and Modified Sources; Final Rule’ of 3 June 2016,
40 CFR Part 60 (2016) 81(107) Federal Register 35824; through
these practices, the rule is projected to reduce annual GHG
emissions by 11 million metric tons of CO2e, see EPA, 'Fact sheet'
(n 84) 4.
86 EPA, ‘Review of the 2016 Oil and Gas New Source Performance
Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources’ of , 40
CFR Part 60 (2017) Federal Register
87 EPA, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Letter of 6
March 2017 <https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-03/
documents/oil_and_gas_information_request_withdrawal_letter
_sample_to_post_1.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017.
88 Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (BLM),
‘Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource
Conservation’ of 18 November 2016, 43 CFR Parts 3100, 3160
and 3170 (2016) 81(223) Federal Register 83008.
89 115th Congress, HJRes. 36, ‘Providing for Congressional Disap-
proval under Chapter 8 of Title 5, United States Code, of the
Final Rule of the Bureau of Land Management relating to “Waste
Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Con-
servation”’ (3 February 2017).
90 Department of the Interior (DOI), Order No. 3338, ‘Discretionary
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement to Modernize the
Federal Coal Program’ (15 January 2016), ss 4 and 5.
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the underlying programme.91 Another rule targeted
by the Executive Order relates to hydraulic fractur-
ing on federal and tribal lands, and imposes new re-
quirements for wellbore integrity, water quality and
public disclosure of hydraulic fracturing operations
and chemical use.92 On 21 June 2016, the US District
Court for Wyoming issued a decision setting aside
the hydraulic fracturing rule,93 but that outcome was
appealed by the previous administration; the current
administration has since filed a motion with the US
Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit to hold the case
in abeyance pending administrative action,94 indi-
cating its intention to issue a notice of proposed rule-
making to revise or rescind the hydraulic fracturing
rule.
Finally, the Executive Order ends, with immediate
effect, the use of the social cost of carbon as a metric
to monetize the value of changes in GHG emissions
from regulations, disbands the Interagency Working
Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, and with-
draws related technical support and update docu-
ments.95 Going forward, agencies will instead apply
guidance on regulatory analysis issued by the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) during the pres-
idency of George W. Bush,96 and, as the Executive Or-
der further directs, ‘with respect to the consideration
of domestic versus international impacts and the con-
sideration of appropriate discount rates.’ During the
administration of President Barack Obama, the EPA
and other federal agencies used an estimate of the
social cost of carbon to calculate the benefits gained
from a reduction in GHG emissions after a federal
court ordered the practice in 2007.97 It represents a
measure, in dollars, of the long-term damage done
by a ton of CO2 emissions in a given year, and is cur-
rently set at $36 per ton of CO2.
98 Under the tradi-
tional cost-benefit analysis federal agencies will now
return to, the cost associated with GHG emissions is
likely to be significantly lower,99 making it more dif-
ficult to argue net economic benefits from climate
mitigation policies. A second and related provision
in the Executive Order100 directs the Council on En-
vironmental Quality (CEQ) to rescind guidance is-
sued under the previous administration requiring
federal agencies to consider climate change when
conducting reviews under the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act (NEPA).101 In early April, the CEQ is-
sued a notice announcing the withdrawal of this guid-
ance.102
Despite the sweeping scope of this Executive Or-
der, the next section will argue that it may ultimate-
ly remain a symbolic measure by the administration
that is likely to suffer lengthy procedural and judi-
cial delays, its effectiveness limited by market dy-
91 Department of the Interior (DOI), Order No 3348, ‘Concerning
the Federal Coal Moratorium’ (29 March 2017), s 4.
92 Department of the Interior (DOI), Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), ‘Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian
Lands; Final Rule’ of 20 March 2015, 43 CFR Part 3160 (2016)
80(58) Federal Register 16128.
93 US District Court of Wyoming, Wyoming et al v Department of
Interior, Case No 2:15-cv-00041-SWS (D Wyo filed 21 June
2016).
94 US Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit, Wyoming et al v Department of
Interior, Nos. 16-8068, 16-8069, ‘Federal Appellants’ Motion to
Continue Argument and Hold Case in Abeyance Pending Admin-
istrative Action’ (15 March 2017).
95 Executive Order 13783 (n 64) s 5.
96 Office of Management and Budget (OMB), ‘Circular A-4: To the
Heads of Executive Agencies and Establishments. Subject: Regu-
latory Analysis.’ (17 September 2003) <https://georgewbush
-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.html> accessed
31 March 2017.
97 US Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, Center for Biological
Diversity v National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, F3d--,
2007 US App Case No 06-71891 (9th Cir, 15 November 2007).
98 For the year 2015, assuming a 3% discount rate, see Interagency
Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases (IWG),
‘Technical Support Document: Technical Update of the Social
Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis under Executive
Order 12866’ (August 2016). This figure is calculated using a
complex, and controversial, set of models estimating future costs
to society arising from the impacts of a changing climate, and
then applying a discount rate to determine the net present value
of limiting such future damages, see National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Valuing Climate Damages:
Updating Estimation of the Social Cost of Carbon Dioxide (Na-
tional Academies Press 2017).
99 Especially if international impacts are disregarded and a higher
discount rate applies, as the Executive Order indicates; the con-
ventional approach to cost-benefit estimates described in the
OMB guidance document focuses on domestic impacts and
excludes damages that are incurred outside the US, whereas the
IWG that elaborated the social cost of carbon decided that,
because climate change is a global concern, global impacts
would be taken into account.
100 Executive Order 13783 (n 64) s 3(c).
101 Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), ‘Final Guidance for
Federal Departments and Agencies on Consideration of Green-
house Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act Reviews’ of 1 August 2016 (2016)
81(51) Federal Register 51866.
102 Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), ‘Withdrawal of Final
Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Considera-
tion of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate
Change in National Environmental Policy Act Reviews’ of 5 April
2017 (2017) 82(64) Federal Register 16576.
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namics and continued state and local action; and that
it yet may be, at the same time, an astute political ma-
neuver that sends important signals to climate poli-
cy advocates both domestically and abroad.
III. Analysis
1. Means as an End: Procedural Inertia
and Litigation
As outlined in the preceding section, executive ac-
tion taken so far by the current administration on cli-
mate change has a clear center of gravity on unrav-
elling policies set in place by the previous adminis-
tration. Even where those policies were implement-
ed by way of agency regulations rather than statuto-
ry legislation, which – given the partisan rift on cli-
mate change in both chambers of Congress – is the
case with a majority of climate measures taken dur-
ing the presidency of Barack Obama, repealing his
climate legacy will not be an expeditious and straight-
forward process. Alternative pathways exist to undo
the current climate policy framework, but each is sub-
ject to detailed procedural requirements and con-
straints.
For regulatory action taken within 60 legislative
days of the end of the last congressional session, the
CRA allows Congress to pass a joint resolution with
simple majority votes in both chambers to ‘disap-
prove’ regulatory action taken during the first 75
days of the next session.103 To date, the 115th Con-
gress has successfully applied this process with
greater frequency than any previous Congress since
enactment of the provision over two decades ago.104
Once disapproved, the CRA also prohibits reissuing
the rule in substantially the same form or issuing a
new rule that is substantially the same, ‘unless the
reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a
law enacted after the date of the joint resolution dis-
approving the original rule.’105 Despite its conclusive
effect, the applicability of this process is limited: on-
ly agency rules finalised by the previous administra-
tion on or after 13 June 2016 can be subjected to the
expedited review,106 and the opportunity to do so
will close once the 115th Congress exceeds 75 days in
session. After that, Congress can still pass substan-
tive legislation to repeal or revise agency rules or in-
deed the legislation that sets out the rulemaking au-
thority underlying such rules. In both cases, howev-
er, Senate cloture and filibuster rules require a high-
er voting threshold of 60 votes to move such legisla-
tion to a vote,107 provided the Senate does not in-
voke a procedure that allows overriding any rule or
precedent by a simple majority of 51 votes.108 Ap-
propriation bills on discretionary spending are an-
other exception where Congress could pass a final
budget proposal from the administration with a sim-
ple majority. But while this process could effective-
ly be used to defund an agency such as the EPA, it
would prove politically contentious and may incite
litigation.
Absent congressional repeal, the administration
can overturn certain measures itself through execu-
tive action. A majority of the Executive Orders de-
scribed in the previous section direct federal agen-
cies to review and, if appropriate, initiate proceed-
ings to suspend, revise or rescind various guidelines,
orders and regulations adopted during the previous
administration. For instance, the Executive Order on
‘Promoting Energy Independence and Economic
Growth’ calls upon the EPA to review and potential-
ly suspend, revise or rescind the Clean Power
Plan,109 prompting the agency to publish a notice
103 Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking (n 56) § 802(a).
104 See, for instance, 115th Congress HJRes 38 (n 57) and 115th
Congress HJRes 36 (n 89) above regarding the ‘Stream Protection
Rule’ and the BLM regulation curbing methane emissions from
federal lands; an additional rule that has been repealed under the
CRA would have required US energy companies to disclose
payments made to governments for the commercial development
of oil, natural gas, or minerals, see Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), ‘Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extrac-
tion Issuers’ of 27 July 2016, 17 CFR Parts 240 and 249b (2016)
81(144) Federal Register 49359, repealed by 115th Congress,
HJRes41, ‘Providing for Congressional Disapproval under Chapter
8 of Title 5, United States Code, of a Rule Submitted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission relating to “Disclosure of
Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers”’ (14 February 2017)
Publ L 115-4.
105 Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking (n 56) § 801(b)(2).
106 Christopher M Davis and Richard S Beth, ‘Agency Final Rules
Submitted on or After June 13, 2016, May Be Subject to Disap-
proval by the 115th Congress’ (CRS Insight, 15 December 2016)
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IN10437.pdf> accessed 29 March
2017.
107 US Senate, Rules of the Senate, ‘Precedence of Motions (Rule
XXII)’: ‘three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn.’
108 A controversial procedure, known as the ‘constitutional’ or
‘nuclear option’, that has rarely been invoked and is considered
vital to protect bipartisanship in the Senate; for background, see
Betsy Palmer, ‘Changing Senate Rules: The “Constitutional” or
“Nuclear” Option’ (Congressional Research Service, 26 May
2005) <http://research.policyarchive.org/176.pdf> accessed 29
March 2017.
109 Executive Order 13783 (n 64) s 4.
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announcing such a review, providing advanced no-
tice of forthcoming rulemaking proceedings, and
setting out principles that it will consider in the
process.110 Should the administration, based on the
review in this and any other cases, decide to sus-
pend, revise or rescind existing regulations, it will
have to adhere to an established procedure. Under
the Administrative Procedure Act and specialised
statutes such as the Clean Air Act, proposed rules
suspending, revising, or rescinding existing rules
have to be published for notice and comment,111 a
protracted process that can require three to six
months to complete and result in considerable pub-
lic input.112 What follows is the preparation of a fi-
nal rule, with any necessary revisions, along with
development of appropriate responses to public
comments, continued stakeholder engagement, and
legal and policy review of the rule, adding up to two
more years to the process.113 A less onerous process
applies to actions that did not go through formal no-
tice and comment proceedings, such as Executive
and Secretarial Orders, guidelines and reports, all of
which can be revoked with immediate effect by ex-
ecutive fiat.
While the ability of federal agencies to revisit ex-
isting regulations, including authority to reconsider
and rescind or revise past decisions, has been af-
firmed with ample judicial precedent, such action
must be supported by a ‘reasonable explanation’ and
demonstrate that ‘there are good reasons for the new
policy.’114 In effect, ruling on a regulatory reversal
during the presidency of Ronald W Reagan, the
Supreme Court required that ‘[a]n agency changing
its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply
a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which
may be required when an agency does not act in the
first instance.’115 This is generally interpreted to
mean that the agency must examine the relevant da-
ta and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its ac-
tion, building a robust record of scientific, econom-
ic, and other supporting information. In order to re-
scind the Clean Power Plan, for instance, the EPA
would have to establish that rescission of the rule is
not contrary to the Clean Air Act, is reasonable, and
does not endanger public health or welfare. As long
as the endangerment finding for GHG emissions116
adopted during the previous administration remains
in place – and none of the executive actions of the
current administration have suggested repealing it,
a process that would entail its own challenges117 –
the EPA would have to establish new emission guide-
lines, although it could then assume a more modest
110 EPA, ‘Review of the Clean Power Plan’ (n 82); guiding principles
the EPA will apply include: determining whether the Clean Power
Plan is appropriately grounded in EPA’s statutory authority and
consistent with the rule of law; whether it appropriately promotes
cooperative federalism and respects the authority and powers that
are reserved to the states; whether it effects the administration’s
dual goals of protecting public health and welfare while also
supporting economic growth and job creation; whether it appro-
priately maintains the diversity of reliable energy resources and
encourages the production of domestic energy sources to achieve
energy independence and security; and whether the rule and
alternative approaches will provide benefits that substantially
exceed their costs.
111 79th Congress, S7, ‘An Act to Improve the Administration of
Justice by Prescribing Fair Administrative Procedure’ (11 June
1946) Pub L 79–404, 60 Stat 237, US Code Title 5 Part I Chapter
5 § 553; a limited exception to the need for notice and comment
applies under § 553(b) where an agency finds good cause that
related procedures ‘are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to
the public interest’, but this generally only covers situations of
great urgency.
112 In the case of the Clean Power Plan, for instance, the EPA re-
ceived 4.3 million public comments, see EPA, ‘Fact Sheet: Clean
Power Plan by the Numbers’ (3 August 2015) <https://www.epa
.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/fs-cpp-by-the
-numbers.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017.
113 Thomas A Lorenzen and Sherrie A Armstrong, ‘Change in Admin-
istrations, Change in Course? What the Next President Could Do
to Vacate or Reform Obama’s Clean Power Plan (Part 2 of 2)’
(Trends 48(2), November/December 2016) <http://www
.americanbar.org/publications/trends/2016-2017/november
-december-2016/change_in_administrations.html> accessed 29
March 2017.
114 See US Supreme Court, Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) v Fox Television Stations, Inc, 556 US 502, 515 (S Ct 28
April 2009).
115 US Supreme Court, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of
the United States Inc et al, v State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance C, et al, 463 US 29, 42 (S Ct 24 June 1983), para (a).
See also Merrick B Garland, ‘Deregulation and Judicial Review’
(1985) 98 Harv L R 507.
116 EPA (n 40).
117 Simply withdrawing the finding would violate the Supreme Court
ruling in Massachusetts et al v EPA (n 40). It would have to be
replaced with a new finding supported by a similarly voluminous
scientific foundation as that underlying the original endanger-
ment finding, which was based on the scientific research com-
piled by, inter alia, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), the US Global Climate Research Programme and
the National Research Council. The endangerment finding was
upheld by the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit in 2012,
when the court found that the EPA’s interpretation of its authority
and of its obligation to regulate carbon dioxide ‘is unambiguously
correct’, US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, Coalition for
Responsible Regulation, Inc, et al, v EPA, et al, No 09-1322 (DC
Cir, 26 June 2012). Recently, however, Pruitt has come under
increasing pressure from the right to repeal the endangerment
finding as the basis for much of the regulatory action his agency
has issued, see Coral Davenport, ‘Scott Pruitt Faces Anger From
Right Over E.P.A. Finding He Won’t Fight’ (New York Times, 12
April 2017).
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‘best system of emissions reduction’, or grant states
the ability to seek more exemptions.118 Even then,
the new standards would have to be justified with
reasoning based on the provisions of Clean Air Act
or risk being considered ‘arbitrary and capricious’119
and thus failing judicial scrutiny.120 Only if a feder-
al court rules that the EPA lacks authority to regu-
late GHG emissions from existing sources – an argu-
ment cited by several petitioners in litigation to set
aside the Clean Power Plan121 – would a rescission
without replacement be admissible, yet it would still
not affect the obligation of the EPA to address emis-
sions from new stationary sources and mobile
sources.
Where regulations are currently subject to pend-
ing litigation, as is the case with the Clean Power Plan,
the administration effectively has an additional
venue to stall or repeal climate regulations. Within
months of its release, the Clean Power Plan became
the most heavily litigated federal environmental reg-
ulation in US history,122 with lawsuits from – at one
point – 27 states as well as countless other petition-
ers, such as energy companies and local electric util-
ities, rural electric cooperatives, labour unions, indus-
try and trade associations, and additional stakehold-
ers challenging the legality of the rule and accusing
the administration of regulatory overreach; mean-
while, a large number of intervenors and amici curi-
ae – including states, counties and municipalities,
former cabinet members and more than half of all
current Members of Congress – filed briefs support-
ing or opposing the foregoing petitions.123 After the
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit consolidated these petitions into one case,124 an
interlocutory application resulted in the US Supreme
Court staying implementation of the Clean Power
Plan on 9 February 2016 until a lower court issues a
ruling on the merits of the case.125 So far, no ruling
has been made,126 and President Trump’s Executive
Order affords the Attorney General discretion to re-
quest a stay of the litigation or seek other appropri-
ate relief pending reconsideration of the Clean Pow-
er Plan by the EPA.127
On the same day as the Executive Order was
signed, the administration filed a motion with the
court to hold litigation against the rule in abeyance
pending administrative action, asking for a standstill
‘until 30 days after the conclusion of review and any
resulting forthcoming rulemaking.’128 Such a volun-
tary remand could be denied by the court, however,
which might allow the case to continue on its merits
until formal withdrawal of the contested rule. Alter-
natively, the new administration could have admit-
ted error and asked the court to vacate the Clean Pow-
er Plan or simply declined to defend it, obviating the
lengthy procedure needed to rescind the rule by way
118 While still Attorney General of Oklahoma, Scott Pruitt issued a
plan to replace the Clean Power Plan with a framework that would
have only called for emissions reductions achievable ‘inside the
fenceline’ at individual power plants (which would include heat
rate improvements, but not fuel switching), and would have
required states to to adopt such federal standards unless the state
determined that circumstances justified the imposition of a less
stringent emission standard, rendering the standards more an
aspirational guideline than a binding requirement, see E Scott
Pruitt, ‘The Oklahoma Attorney General’s Plan: The Clean Air Act
Section 111(d) Framework that Preserves States’ Rights’ (April
2014) <http://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3444765/Scott
-Pruitt-Clean-Air-Act-States-Rights.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017.
119 Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (n 111) § 706(2)(A).
120 Supreme Court (n 40); in the ruling on Massachusetts et al v EPA,
the court affirmed that decisions not to regulate cannot rest on
‘reasoning divorced from the statutory text’, and that the EPA must
‘ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute’ and
‘exercise its discretion within defined statutory limits.’
121 US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, Docket for State of West
Virginia, et al, v EPA, et al, No 15-1363 (and consolidated cases)
(DC Cir, 23 October 2015); one argument, based on divergences
in the House and Senate bills that amended the Clean Air Act in
1990 and were never reconciled, is that §111(d) of the Clean Air
Act cannot serve as a basis for regulation of existing power plants
because these already are subject to rules on mercury pollution
under §112.
122 Samuel Kernell, Gary C Jacobson, Thad Kousser and Lynn
Vavreck, The Logic of American Politics (8th edn, CQ Press 2018)
83.
123 For an overview, see Linda Tsang and Alexandra M Wyatt, ‘Clean
Power Plan: Legal Background and Pending Litigation in West
Virginia v EPA’ 10-2 (Congressional Research Service, 8 March
2017) <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44480.pd > accessed 29
March 2017.
124 State of West Virginia, et al, v EPA, et al (n 121).
125 US Supreme Court, State of West Virginia, et al, v EPA, et al,
Order in Pending Case, No 15A773 (S Ct 9 February 2016)
<https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/cour-
torders/020916zr4_4g15.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017. This
decision marks the first time that the Supreme Court has stayed or
enjoined a final agency rule where a lower court had, after brief-
ing, declined to do so. Justice Antonin Scalia death four days
later, on 13 February 2016, would have likely resulted in a split
decision, uphold the decision of the US Court of Appeals for the
DC Circuit to deny the stay.
126 On 27 September 2016, the US Court of Appeals for the DC
Circuit heard oral argument en banc, but a ruling is still pend-
ing.
127 Executive Order 13783 (n 64) s 4(d).
128 US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit (n 81).
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of executive action. But judicial precedent suggests
a motion to vacate would be denied,129 and the inter-
venors in support of the rule would also likely con-
tinue to defend the rule. Indeed, on 5 April 2017, a
coalition of 17 states, six municipalities and the Dis-
trict of Columbia filed opposition to the motion to
hold the cases in abeyance, arguing that the case ‘is
ripe for decision now’ and that a decision from the
court would ‘resolve critical live disputes over the
scope of the Clean Air Act that will not only deter-
mine the enforcement of the Clean Power Plan, but
also affect any reconsideration or revision of the Rule
that EPA may undertake.’130 Among the main issues
at dispute is whether the Clean Air Act affords the
EPA authority to regulate emissions from existing
sources under more than one provision, and whether
the ‘best system of emissions reduction’ can be based
on actions that cannot be taken by each compliance
entity alone, such as shifting dispatch from coal- to
gas-fired electricity generation.
Finally, the administration could seek to under-
mine the effect of President Obama’s regulatory lega-
cy by exercising its discretionary enforcement pow-
ers and refusing to enforce compliance obligations.
In that case, however, the regulations would remain
in full effect, affording stakeholders and other per-
sons standing to initiate judicial proceedings – for
instance a citizen suit under Section 304(a) of the
Clean Air Act – against the relevant agency or alleged
violators to enforce those obligations. Also, while lax-
ity in the enforcement of environmental rules has
been used as a political strategy under earlier admin-
istrations, it has practical limitations, as most com-
panies in affected sectors will still follow the law and
protect their public reputation. A casual approach to
enforcement will therefore only afford partial relief
to compliance entities, and entail new and undesir-
able uncertainty.131
2. Limits to Federal Power: The Role of
States and Markets
For all the discussion about the scope of regulatory
rollback facing US climate policy, it is also important
to bear in mind the constitutional limits on federal
powers in the area of climate change, as well as the
role of market dynamics and fundamentals in driving
the reduction of carbon emissions in North America.
Under the US Constitution, both the federal and
state governments enjoy some exclusive powers in
the areas of energy and environmental policy, and
exercise other powers in common.132 As a result, cli-
mate legislation and executive rulemaking in the US
form part of a dynamic and evolving tapestry of fed-
eral, state and local action,133with a periodically shift-
ing locus of progressive climate ambition.134 Many
policies that are driving GHG emissions reductions
across North America, such as binding mitigation tar-
gets, renewable portfolio standards and energy effi-
ciency standards, have been adopted at the state lev-
el, while federal policy – with the exception of inter-
national diplomacy – arguably played only a limited
role until well into the first term of President Oba-
ma. Previously, the US had no federal climate targets,
and between periods of federal inaction and time lost
over failed attempts to pass federal climate legisla-
tion, progressive states and municipalities inevitably
rose to fill the policy vacuum.
More recently, federal action – and especially ex-
ecutive rulemaking – have gained in importance, as
is evidenced by the contested climate policy legacy
of the Obama administration, but with pivotal ele-
ments of that legacy not yet or just recently entered
into force, the importance of federal climate policy
in the Madisonian polity of the US can be easily over-
stated.135 This point is further reinforced by the ob-
129 A district court ruling in National Parks Conservation Association
v Salazar, Case No. 1:09-cv-00115 (12 August 2009) held that
vacatur was not appropriate absent a merits ruling, significant
new evidence, or the agreement of all parties, and that otherwise
it would ‘wrongfully permit the Federal defendants to bypass
established statutory procedures for repealing an agency rule’
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), see idem 4–5.
130 US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, State of West Virginia, et
al, v EPA, et al, No 15-1363 (and consolidated cases), ‘State and
Municipal Respondent-Intervenors’ Opposition to Motion to Hold
Proceeding in Abeyance’ (5 April 2017).
131 Lorenzen et al (n 113).
132 While power has gradually shifted away from the states and
towards the federal government under a number of constitutional
doctrines, such as the dormant commerce clause, the compact
clause, or foreign affairs preemption, a basic principle of Ameri-
can federalism, set out in the Tenth Amendment, remains that the
‘powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.’ For further details, see Daniel A. Farber,
‘Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution’ (2008) 50
Ariz L R 879.
133 For an overview, see Michael Mehling and David J Frenkil,
‘Climate Law in the United States: Facing Structural and Procedur-
al Limitations’ in Erkki J Hollo, Kati Kulovesi and Michael Mehling
(eds), Climate Change and the Law (Springer 2013) 480-81.
134 Barry Rabe, ‘Contested Federalism and American Climate Policy’
(2011) 41 Publius 494.
135 Bloomberg (n 68).
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servation that GHG emissions in North America have
declined significantly in recent years, dropping 11.2%
between 2005 and 2015,136 even as many federal cli-
mate policies have yet to exert a noticeable effect. But
it would also be misguided to dismiss the role of fed-
eral action in limiting emissions from federal lands
and buildings, as well as the activities of the various
branches of government, including the military. And
although less tangible, the signalling effect of feder-
al policy direction in shaping expectations of the pri-
vate sector can be critical for sound strategic plan-
ning and investment choices compatible with the
long time horizon of decarbonisation. Altogether, the
various ways in which federal policy nonetheless af-
fects US emissions have prompted analysts to project
that the regulatory rollback pursued by the Trump
administration will slow down emissions reductions
from 21% to 14% below 2005 emissions by 2025.137
Still, the outsized influence of dynamic market
forces on changes in US emissions should not be ig-
nored, and may ultimately disprove conservative
forecasts as it has so frequently in the past.138 Out-
pacing overall emissions abatement, emissions from
electricity generation are currently at their lowest lev-
el since 1993, another major trend not predicted on-
ly some years ago. Over two thirds of those reduc-
tions are ascribed to fuel switching from coal to nat-
ural gas, a result of falling gas prices made possible
by the rapid growth in supply from increasingly ef-
ficient hydraulic fracturing practices.139 A corollary
of this competition between coal and gas is falling
demand for coal, which has declined 27% since 2005
and significantly weakened the coal mining indus-
try, along with its employment potential.140 Given
that many executive actions surveyed earlier in this
article directly promote the production and use of
hydrocarbons, including shale gas, it is difficult to
see how President Trump can nonetheless achieve
his campaign promise of spurring a revival of the
coal sector.141
Adding to the competitive pressures facing coal is
another sector in which innovation and scale are
rapidly lowering prices: renewable energy. In 2016
alone, the US saw installation of nearly 15 GW of new
solar photovoltaic generating capacity, outpacing any
other source of new generation.142 With deployment
increasingly independent from policy support,
movement by many US states to expand their renew-
able energy mandates, and public investment in re-
search and development continuing in other parts of
the world even as the US might cut back federal
funds, the global market for renewable energy is un-
likely to lose momentum. If any single technology
will suffer from a potential rescission or weakening
of the Clean Power Plan, it is nuclear energy, which
is likewise facing competitive pressures and would
have stood to benefit from the regulatory incentive
for low-carbon energy generation.143
136 EPA, ‘Draft Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Sinks: 1990-2015’ 10 (15 February 2017) <https://www.epa.gov/
sites/production/files/2017-02/documents/2017_complete_report
.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017.
137 John Larsen, Kate Larsen, Whitney Ketchum, Shashank Mohan,
and Trevor Houser, ‘Trump's Regulatory Rollback Begins’ (27
March 2017) <http://rhg.com/notes/trumps-regulatory-rollback
-begins> accessed 29 March 2017.
138 See, eg, Sergey V Paltsev, ‘Energy Scenarios: The Value and
Limits of Scenario Analysis’ (2017) WIREs Energy and Environ-
ment, forthcoming.
139 Energy Information Administration (EIA), ‘U.S. Energy-related
Carbon Dioxide Emissions in 2015 are 12% Below Their 2005
Levels’ (9 May 2016) <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail
.php?id=26152> accessed 29 March 2017; idem, ‘Carbon Diox-
ide Emissions from Electricity Generation in 2015 Were Lowest
Since 1993’ (13 May 2016) <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=26232> accessed 29 March 2017. A recent down-
turn in oil prices forced the US hydrocarbon industry to improve
the efficiency of its operations, helping breakeven costs on shale
oil and gas wells to drop by an average of 22% per year since
2013, see Rystad Energy, ‘Average Shale Wellhead Breakeven
Prices Are Below 40 USD/BBL’ (28 July 2016) <https://www
.rystadenergy.com/NewsEvents/PressReleases/shale-well
-breakeven> accessed 29 March 2017.
140 Coal had been seeing a steep decline in jobs across its supply
chain well before the Obama administration began implementing
climate regulations, see eg Drew Haerer and Lincoln Pratson,
‘Employment Trends in the U.S. Electricity Sector, 2008–2012’
(2015) 82 Energy Policy 85. A recent calculation by the Sierra
Club estimates that jobs in renewable energy already outnumber
all fossil fuel jobs by over 2.5 to 1 nationally, see Sierra Club,
‘Clean Energy Jobs Overwhelm Coal, Oil & Gas in 41 States and
D.C.’ (27 March 2017) <http://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/03/
27/document_gw_04.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017.
141 As Vaclav Smil has described it, ‘[t]he retreat from American coal
mining was not caused by President Barack Obama’s environmen-
tal regulations or by any ideological dislike of the fuel that provid-
ed the energy foundations of modern civilization. The history of
energy use is a sequence of transitions to sources that are cheaper,
cleaner and more flexible.’ idem, ‘Trump’s Coal Policy Will Likely
Do Just What Obama’s Did’ (Washington Post, 29 March 2017).
142 Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA) and GTM Research,
‘U.S. Solar Market Insight 2016 Year in Review’ (9 March 2017)
<http://www.greentechmedia.com/research/subscription/u.s.-solar
-market-insight> accessed 29 March 2017.
143 A large portion of the US nuclear fleet is approaching the end of
its normal operating lifespan, with eight plants providing about
9.3 GW of generating capacity subject to retirement over the next
few years, see Jim Krane and Elsie Hung, ‘United States’ Energy
and Climate Policy under President Trump: Ramifications for
Energy Markets and the GCC’ (Emirates Diplomatic Academy,
February 2017) <http://www.eda.ac.ae/images/pdf/
EDAInsightUSEnergyClimatePolicyTrumpEN.pdf> accessed 29
March 2017.
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Adding the risk that future administrations will
reinstate any carbon constraints withdrawn by the
Trump administration,144 it is unsurprising that util-
ities mostly expect a sustained transition to renew-
able energy and natural gas, and are planning their
investment decisions accordingly.145 Overall, the fed-
eral climate regulations that now stand to be re-
viewed and possibly withdrawn are not, thus, the
main drivers of recent US renewable energy growth
and GHG emissions reductions as much as shifting
market fundamentals and state action. In fact, even
before the Clean Power Plan could take effect, a ma-
jority of states – including several states that have
been strongly opposed to the regulation and joined
judicial proceedings against it – had been on track to
achieving their state targets, again driven mostly by
subnational policies and market forces.146 Multiple
interrelated uncertainties will make it difficult or
even impossible to determine the precise extent, but
there is definitely truth to the argument that much
of President Obama’s climate legacy merely traced
and locked in fundamental trends that were already
underway.147
On the margin, admittedly, regulatory relief from
the reform agenda of the current administration may
make some coal companies economically more vi-
able, and may help delay the retirement of older ther-
mal generation capacity. Increased exports of lique-
fied natural gas (LNG) may also result in higher do-
mestic prices, temporarily reversing some of the fu-
el switching effects observed in recent years.148
Should that trend amplify over time, rules like the
Clean Power Plan and the New Source Performance
Standards would have played an important, but ulti-
mately hypothetical, role as hedges against a coal re-
vival driven by evolving market fundamentals. Still,
it does not negate the argument that federal climate
regulations played a subordinate role to market dy-
namics and state or local action in driving recent
emission reductions. For international observers,
that may provide scarce consolation, given how
much less predictable and properly documented
these latter factors are. Annulment of regulations
such as the Clean Power Plan may therefore have a
greater impact on the political dynamics of interna-
tional climate cooperation than is warranted by their
actual mitigation effect, a possibility discussed in the
next subsection.
3. International Cooperation and the
Paris Agreement
In contrast to its restless pace when it comes to
rolling back domestic climate polices, the new ad-
ministration has offered far less guidance on the fu-
ture direction of foreign policy and international co-
operation. US bilateral engagement with China in re-
cent years is often credited with facilitating passage
of the Paris Agreement, adding that breakthrough in
international climate diplomacy to the legacy of for-
mer President Obama. Despite the uncertainties, it
can be safely assumed that the administration of
President Trump will not extend this legacy of cli-
mate leadership. In fact, rhetoric from the election
campaign seemed to indicate a full US withdrawal
from the international climate process operating un-
der the auspices of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC):149 on
various occasions, such as during his campaign
speech in Bismarck, ND, candidate Trump had an-
nounced he would ‘cancel’ the Paris Agreement and
withhold all contributions to international climate
funds.150
Likewise, several members of his transition team
and wider advisory circle made no secret about their
144 Jim Krane, ‘Climate Risk and the Fossil Fuel Industry: Two Feet
High and Rising’ (Baker Institute for Public Policy, July 2016)
<https://scholarship.rice.edu/handle/1911/91261> accessed 29
March 2017.
145 Utility Dive, ‘State of the Electric Utility Survey 2017’ (28 March
2017) <http://s3.amazonaws.com/dive_assets/rlpsys/SEU_2017
.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017.
146 Nicholas Bianco, Tomás Carbonell and Martha Roberts, ‘Clean
Power Plan Compliance Within Reach for Litigating Companies’
(Environmental Defense Fund, 26 September 2016) <http://www
.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/2016-09-26_edf_fact_sheet
_-_power_companies_opposing_final.pdf> accessed 29 March
2017.
147 Eric Holthaus, ‘Buried in Obama’s Climate Plan: A Promise of
Business as Usual to the Fossil Fuel Industry’ (Slate, 4 August
2015) <http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/08/04/
obama_s_clean_power_plan_analysis_business_as_usual_for_the
_fossil_fuel.html> accessed 1 April 2017. Holthaus cites a pas-
sage in the Clean Power Plan rule, EPA (n 73) 636, which ex-
pressly concedes that it is ‘fully consistent with the recent
changes and current trends in electricity generation, and as a
result, would by no means entail fundamental redirection of the
energy sector’.
148 Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2 ‘Short-Term Energy
Outlook (STEO)’ (11 April 2017) <https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/
steo/pdf/steo_full.pdf> accessed 11 April 2017.
149 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), New York (9 May 1992, in force 21 March 1994)
(1992) 31 ILM 849.
150 Trump (n 3).
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preferred course of action: full withdrawal from the
international climate process.151 Given the national-
ist and protectionist narratives invoked throughout
the election campaign, such a withdrawal would al-
so be consistent with the rejection of more globalist
foreign policies espoused by Donald Trump’s recent
predecessors, both in Democratic and Republican ad-
ministrations. But aside from some internal staffing
and workflow decisions152 and the budget blueprint,
which calls for ceasing ‘payments to the United Na-
tions’ (UN) climate change programs’,153 and will still
see extensive amendments as it passes through Con-
gress, there has yet to be a clear statement from the
White House about whether the US will formally re-
nounce the Paris Agreement and the broader climate
regime, or remain – possibly passive – participants.
Different pathways can lead to a formal withdraw-
al from the climate regime. For the Paris Agreement,
the process is detailed in Article 28, which allows
parties to pull out at ‘any time after three years’ from
the date on which the agreement entered into force
for them, with effect ‘upon expiry of one year from
the date of receipt … of the notification of withdraw-
al’.154 Given that the Paris Agreement entered into
force for the US on 4 November 2016, the earliest
date by which the latter could notify its intention to
withdraw would be 4 November 2019, allowing the
withdrawal to take effect on 4 November 2020, to-
wards the end of President Trump’s current term in
office. Alternatively, the US could formally withdraw
from the UNFCCC pursuant to its Article 25, which
describes a very similar process. Because the UNFC-
CC has been in force for the US since 21 March
1994,155 the withdrawal could be notified immedi-
ately, allowing it to take effect within one year. Both
treaties specify that a withdrawal from the UNFCCC
– as the ‘mother convention’ – will also entail auto-
matic withdrawal from its subsidiary treaties, which
includes the Paris Agreement. Although some com-
mentators have suggested that exiting the UNFCCC
constitutes ‘an executive branch power’ that does not
require Congressional approval or ratification,156 it
bears remembering that the UNFCCC was ratified
unanimously by the US Senate, suggesting that the
domestic procedure will depend on whether a with-
drawal is considered a ‘political question’ and thus
a prerogative of the President, or whether the same
Senate voting procedure that already governed the
original ratification applies.157 Rather than with-
draw, the US could also significantly weaken its
pledged mitigation effort, although this would ar-
guably violate the progression duty under the Paris
Agreement.158
Finally, an informal option for the US to disengage
from the international climate regime would consist
in simply ignoring the voluntary pledges made un-
der the Paris Agreement, and adopting a passive or
obstructionist approach to participation.
If the new administration chooses any of the fore-
going options, and especially if it opts for a formal
withdrawal from the UNFCCC, it will likely incur a
substantial diplomatic cost. Such a move might dam-
151 See, eg, Osorio et al (n 4) (regarding Myron Ebell); Surgey (n 4)
(regarding Thomas Pyle); Nicolas D Loris, Brett D Schaefer and
Steven Groves, ‘The U.S. Should Withdraw from the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’ (Heritage
Foundation, 9 June 2016) <http://www.heritage.org/environment/
report/the-us-should-withdraw-the-united-nations-framework
-convention-climate-change> accessed 29 March 2017, citing
‘wasted taxpayer money, higher energy prices, and special treat-
ment … for preferred energy sources and technologies’ as well as
uncertainties in climate science as reasons for formal withdrawal
from the UNFCCC, and also suggesting that extant US law pro-
hibits funding the UNFCCC after the Palestinian Authority acced-
ed in March 2016, under US Code Title 22, Section 287e (Publ L
103–236, 1994): ‘The United States shall not make any voluntary
or assessed contribution: (1) to any affiliated organization of the
United Nations which grants full membership as a state to any
organization or group that does not have the internationally
recognized attributes of statehood.’
152 Within the State Department, the position of Special Envoy for
Climate Change will likely be eliminated going forward; the
appointee to this role helped lead international negotiations
during the previous administration. Instead, work on international
climate policy has apparently been largely ceded to the White
House, see Nahal Toosi and Andrew Restuccia, ‘Nervous State
Department Workers Prepare for Major Restructuring’ (Politico, 9
April 2017) <http://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/state
-department-cuts-restructuring-236796> accessed 29 March
2017.
153 Executive Office (n 23) 33.
154 See Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Annex,
UN Doc FCCC/CP2-15/10/Add.1 (29 January 2016) art 28 (1) and
(2).
155 UNFCCC, ‘Status of Ratification of the Convention’ (no date)
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of
_ratification/items/2631.php> accessed 29 March 2017.
156 Loris et al (n 149) 10.
157 See the ‘political question doctrine’ established by the Supreme
Court in Goldwater v Carter (1979), 444 U.S. 996, regarding the
President’s power to unilaterally nullify the Sino-American Mutual
Defense Treaty. Under Article II Section 2 of the US Constitution,
which states that ‘[t]he President … shall have power, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur’, ratification of the
UNFCCC on 15 October 1992 required a 2/3rds supermajority in
the Senate.
158 See art 4(3) and (11) of Decision 1/CP.21 (n 154).
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age the international reputation of the US and its per-
ceived reliability as an international actor, and reper-
cussions might even spill over into other policy agen-
das in which the current administration has a
stronger interest, such as trade, immigration or de-
fence.159 One question that will invariably emerge in
light of the domestic climate policy reversal is
whether the US can achieve its pledged contribution
of reducing US GHG emissions in 2025 by 26% to
28% compared to 2005 levels,160 something ob-
servers have said to be contingent on full implemen-
tation of the Clean Power Plan and a suite of other
Obama-era policies now threatened with rescis-
sion.161
Whether lacking ambition by the US might pro-
vide an excuse for other countries to ignore their com-
mitments or weaken future pledges, as some fear,162
is difficult to predict. Several influential actors in in-
ternational climate diplomacy, including China and
India, have at least verbally stated an intention to up-
hold their climate ambitions irrespective of contin-
ued US participation.163 Absent US leadership on cli-
mate change, other nations might even seek to fill
the ensuing void: Europe may be too preoccupied
with internal crises to resume its earlier role as a
champion of international climate policy ambi-
tion,164 but emerging nations such as China might
perceive a stronger role in the process as a strategic
opportunity.165 Some observers have expressed opti-
mism that the US will not surrender its leadership
role on climate change, however, in which case it be-
comes particularly important for foreign partners to
understand the domestic realities described in the
previous sections and keep them separate from the
political rhetoric dominating much of the current de-
bate; in diplomatic relations, after all, perceptions do
matter.166
IV. Outlook
Following the recent election, a single party now
holds the presidency and controls the 115th Congress,
having majorities in both the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate. Republicans also hold a major-
ity of governorships and state legislatures, affording
them a concentration of power that will enable
greater transformational change than in many prior
decades. But Donald Trump, effectively the leader of
the Republican Party, brings a brand of nationalist
populism that sets him apart from recent presiden-
cies. While climate policy has long been an issue that
elicits open hostility among many conservatives, the
new president and his cabinet have been described
as a ‘triumph of climate denial’,167 dispensing with
any remaining hesitation to oppose climate action –
and even the acknowledgment of climate science –
on political grounds. As the impacts of a warming at-
159 See, eg, the profound uncertainty created in the UNFCCC Secre-
tariat, prompting its Executive Secretary to issue a statement to
UNFCCC staff: Patricia Espinosa Cantellano, ‘Developments in
the United States’ (31 March 2017) <http://newsroom.unfccc.int/
unfccc-newsroom/developments-in-the-united-states-by-executive
-secretary-patricia-espinosa> accessed 5 April 2017.
160 United States, ‘US Nationally Determined Contribution’ (3
September 2016) <http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/
PublishedDocuments/United%20States%20of%20America
%20First/U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf> accessed
29 March 2017.
161 See Climate Action Tracker, ‘USA’ (25 January 2017) <http://
climateactiontracker.org/countries/usa.html> accessed 10 April
2017.
162 See, eg, David Victor, ‘What a Trump Win Means For the Global
Climate Fight’ (YaleEnvironment360, 11 November 2016) <http://
e360.yale.edu/features/what_donald_trump_win_means_for
_global_climate_fight> accessed 31 March 2017: ‘With the
withdrawal of U.S. support, efforts to implement the Paris agree-
ment and avoid the most devastating consequences of global
warming have suffered a huge blow.’
163 See Daniel Cusick, ‘U.S. Void in Climate Pact Helps China be a
“Superpower”’ (ClimateWire, 10 March 2017) <https://www
.eenews.net/climatewire/2017/03/10/stories/1060051270> ac-
cessed 29 March 2017; Zachary Shahan, ‘India Commits To
Continued Climate & Cleantech Leadership In Spite Of Trump’
(CleanTechnica, 19 January 2017) <https://cleantechnica.com/
2017/01/19/india-commits-to-continued-cleantech-leadership-in
-face-of-trump-video/> accessed 29 March 2017.
164 Michael Mehling, Kati Kulovesi and Javier de Cendra de Larragán,
‘Climate Law and Policy in the European Union: Accidental
Success or Deliberate Leadership?’ in Erkki J Hollo, Kati Kulovesi
and Michael Mehling (eds), Climate Change and the Law
(Springer 2013), 509-520.
165 David Victor, ‘Trump: China Could Take Lead on Climate’ (2016)
539 Nature 495.
166 For instance, Michael J Bloomberg, the former Mayor of New
York City and the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Cities
and Climate Change, declared that ‘the United States can – and
will – meet the commitment it made in Paris in 2015’, adding that
‘[c]laims that the United States will no longer be able to meet its
Paris obligations give other countries an excuse to walk away
from theirs. How terrible it would be if a misunderstanding of
American climate leadership – which is not based in Washington
and never has been – led to an unraveling of the Paris Agree-
ment’, see Bloomberg (n 68).
167 Clare Foran, ‘Donald Trump and the Triumph of Climate-Change
Denial’ (The Atlantic, 25 December 2016) <https://www
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/donald-trump-climate
-change-skeptic-denial/51035> accessed 29 March 2017.
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mosphere become increasingly evident in the US168
and surveys show expanding concern about climate
change,169 the underlying politics remain as partisan
as ever.170
For the US response to climate change, one might
expect this confluence of political power and unfet-
tered partisanship to result in a terminal setback, but
closer scrutiny shows that the outlook is likely more
nuanced. A system of checks and balances and fed-
eral allocation of powers that dates back to well be-
fore anthropogenic climate change first became an
issue may afford existing climate action surprising
resilience against an ideological assault. Pending a
legislative amendment or judicial determination that
relieves the administration of its statutory obligation
to regulate GHG emissions, for instance, the EPA will
arguably find itself in a vulnerable position whenev-
er it seeks to weaken or repeal existing executive
rules, and could be forced to offer a reasoned argu-
ment why the growing body of scientific evidence
on the reality and impacts of climate change nonethe-
less justifies scaling back action. Other federal agen-
cies are bound by similar mandates, such as the DOT
with its requirement to issue fuel economy standards
under federal energy legislation. Challenging the le-
gal basis in all cases would require overturning es-
tablished case law of the Supreme Court or overcom-
ing a filibuster with a supermajority in the Senate.
More likely, given the lengthy administrative
process of notice and comment rulemaking and the
likelihood of subsequent litigation, executive efforts
to reverse climate regulation will merely have the ef-
fect of delaying progress, which translates into lost
time for climate mitigation and adaptation, and a
temporary reprieve for those opposing action. An in-
evitable companion of these delays is regulatory un-
certainty, the natural antagonist of strategic invest-
ment decisions such as those required to achieve
long-term decarbonisation of the economy. While
less dramatic than outright reversal of climate action,
delays and uncertainty represent a tangible – if not
terminal – setback. Ironically, with the appointment
of Neil M Gorsuch to the US Supreme Court, Presi-
dent Trump has installed an opponent of theChevron
doctrine of judicial deference to agency interpreta-
tions,171 increasing the likelihood of judicial scruti-
ny of his executive actions. Around the same time
the Chevron doctrine was being formulated, Merrick
B Garland, chief judge of the influential US Court of
Appeals for the DC Circuit and President Obama’s
unsuccessful nominee for the same Supreme Court
seat, helped define the standard of judicial review for
rescission of agency regulations.172 Deregulation was
on the agenda of the EPA, then headed by Gorsuch’s
mother, Anne M Gorsuch, who had overseen the
largest budget cuts to date at her agency. Cognisant
of how history can repeat itself, federal agencies in
the Trump administration should beware of execu-
tive actions that might appear arbitrary or capricious,
or that incur unreasonable delays in the fulfilment
of statutory obligations.
Any federal lacunae left in the wake of regulatory
reform are where subnational activism and the force
of market fundamentals will be most apparent. States
adopting ambitious mitigation targets or rapidly ma-
turing markets for renewable energy technologies
can each achieve far greater climate progress than
fragmented agency regulations based on contested
authorities, especially where these largely reflect fun-
damental trends that would have unfolded anyway.
Unable to fully reverse even the disputed climate
legacy of his predecessor,173 Donald Trump’s dereg-
ulatory activism will likely be remembered more for
its symbolic bluster and populist rhetoric than actu-
al substantive achievements.
But measured against the level of policy ambition
needed to achieve meaningful decarbonisation in
North America, which would not only require strict
enforcement of existing climate regulations, but al-
so their rapid acceleration and expansion across all
areas of the economy, it becomes clear that the de-
lays, the policy uncertainty and the weakening or se-
lective withdrawal of agency actions could be devas-
tating precisely because they are so far removed from
168 Jerry M Melillo, Terese C Richmond and Gary W Yohe (eds),
Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National
Climate Assessment (US Global Change Research Program 2014).
169 Anthony Leiserowitz et al, Climate Change in the American Mind:
November 2016 (Yale Program on Climate Change Communica-
tion 2017); according to the survey results, Americans over-
whelmingly believe that climate change is happening and that
GHG emissions should be curbed, but fewer respondents are sure
that a changing climate will harm them personally.
170 Riley E Dunlap, Aaron M McCright and Jerrod H Yarosh, ‘The
Political Divide on Climate Change: Partisan Polarization Widens
in the U.S.’ (2016) 58 Env: Sci Pol Sust Dev 4.
171 US Supreme Court, Chevron USA, Inc v Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837 (S Ct 25 June 1984).
172 US Supreme Court (n 115).
173 David Bookbinder, ‘The Obama Climate Legacy’ (Niskanen
Center, 11 April 2017) <https://niskanencenter.org/blog/
greenwashing-obama-climate-legacy/> accessed 12 April 2017.
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the required policy trajectory, a course even President
Obama was unable to hold.174 Instead of building
and improving on the legacy of his predecessor, Don-
ald Trump seems bent on ensuring that future ad-
ministrations will have to start their climate policy
agenda from scratch. Of particular concern are the
cuts to early stage research and development, an area
which markets – for all their current success in in-
creasing the uptake of renewable energy and other
sustainable technologies – do not typically allocate
sufficient resources to.
When considering the inordinate amount of time,
effort and resources invested in elaborating some of
the regulations and orders that are now being chal-
lenged, the scale of this setback becomes evident.
Some changes, moreover, such as the passage of dis-
approval resolutions based on the CRA or severely
curtailed agency budgets and staff capacities,175 will
have a lasting impact beyond the current administra-
tion and constrain the ability of more progressive
successors to rebuild a robust climate policy frame-
work.
When it comes to US participation in internation-
al climate cooperation, care must be taken to distin-
guish political rhetoric at the federal level from fun-
damental drivers and the formidable impact of sub-
national actors, especially when these are energized
by a perceived leadership vacuum in the national cap-
ital. America’s Madisonian model of government en-
sures that climate progress will continue, even if it is
less visible and more heterogeneous than it was dur-
ing the last administration. Still, the power to define
foreign policy rests with the executive branch, and
that comes with numerous opportunities for obstruc-
tion, as exemplified by early tensions in a Ministeri-
al Meetings of the Group of Seven (G7).176 Severely
diminished contributions to international climate fi-
nance would have a measurable impact on the polit-
ical dynamic in international climate negotiations,
and a disengaged US may also have a chilling effect
on the stocktaking and periodic review processes un-
der the Paris Agreement. But to assume that the US
will formally withdraw from the international cli-
mate regime is premature, despite the attendant cam-
paign promises: not only is there disagreement about
the benefits of such withdrawal within the innermost
circle of presidential advisers, but even the unlikeli-
est candidates have come forward to advocate for
continued engagement, such as coal sector execu-
tives.177 A meeting of senior advisers and cabinet of-
ficials scheduled for the second half of April will of-
fer more guidance on administration policy regard-
ing continued participation in the Paris Agree-
ment.178
History can be a useful guide when trying to see
beyond the uncertainty surrounding a new and, in
this case, remarkably unpredictable administration.
Periods of regulatory activism followed by a deregu-
lation reflex are not new in the evolutionary arc of
US environmental policy. Alternative energy and
conservation policies during the Carter administra-
tion gave way to frenzied deregulation and severe
EPA budget cuts under President Reagan; attempts
to pass a national energy tax and foster internation-
al engagement during the Clinton presidency were
succeeded by withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol
and a period of domestic and foreign climate inac-
tion under George W. Bush. In the end, it may be that
174 For the required mitigation efforts to achieve deep decarbonisa-
tion by mid-century, see White House, ‘United States Mid-Centu-
ry Strategy for Deep Decarbonization’ (17 November 2016)
<http://unfccc.int/files/focus/long-term_strategies/application/pdf/
mid_century_strategy_report-final_red.pdf> accessed 29 March
2017; for a global perspective, see Johan Rockström et al, ‘A
Roadmap for Rapid Decarbonization’ (2017) 355 Science 1269.
175 Of all the measures initiated or proposed by the administration of
Donald Trump so far, the requested funding cuts set out in his
budget blueprint may have the most far-reaching implications.
Envisioned spending cutbacks at the EPA, for instance, would
force it to eliminate at least 50 individual programs and nearly
4,000 full-time equivalents in 2018, according to an internal EPA
document that describes policy decisions to adjust to the expect-
ed budget reductions, see David A Bloom, Acting Chief Financial
Officer, EPA, ‘Memorandum: FY 2018 President’s Budget: Major
Policy and Final Resource Decisions’ (21 March 2017), on file
with author. And while individual budget cuts may not be able to
pass Congress and the stakeholder preferences and expectations
constraining lawmakers, the overall agenda of radically reducing
the size of government is very much in line with proposals by the
conservative mainstream, see, for instance, the detailed budget
recommendations compiled by the Heritage Foundation, Blue-
print for Balance: A Federal Budget for 2017 (Heritage Founda-
tion 2016), which foreshadows the extreme cuts to energy, envi-
ronmental, and climate programs in the 2018 Budget Blueprint,
Executive Office (n 12).
176 Andrew Restuccia, ‘Trump’s Climate Demands Roil U.S. Allies’
(Politico, 11 April 2017) <http://www.politico.com/story/2017/
04/trump-fossil-fuels-g7-tension-237129> accessed 12 April
2017.
177 Justin Worland, ‘The Paris Agreement on Climate Change Has
Surprising New Supporters’ (Time, 10 April 2017) <http://time
.com/4731582/coal-companies-climate-change-paris
-agreement/> accessed 12 April 2017.
178 Eric Wolff, Andrew Restuccia and Josh Dawsey, ‘White House
Showdown on Paris Deal Set for Next Week’ (Politico, 14 April
2017) <http://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/paris-climate-pact
-trump-white-house-237234> accessed 15 April 2017.
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President Obama’s progressive stance towards cli-
mate action was as much an outlier from the histor-
ical norm as the more adversarial approach practised
by his predecessor, and that President Trump is mere-
ly affirming a historical pattern as he once again
shifts the dial to the other extreme. Should that be
true, the only way to escape this perpetual cycle of
climate policy support and opposition in the US may
be to seek a more inclusive middle ground, refram-
ing climate action so that it may once again enjoy bi-
partisan approval.179 And while that may moderate
climate progress, it will ultimately be preferable to
the disruption caused by extreme shifts after every
transition of power.
179 Roger Pielke Jr, ‘Experts Respond to Trump’s Climate Blitzkrieg’
(Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 29 March 2017) <http://
thebulletin.org/experts-respond-trump%E2%80%99s-climate
-blitzkrieg10648> accessed 31 March 2017: ‘Can those interested
in climate action remake the subject into a bipartisan issue
respectful of all Americans and their values—regardless of their
political party, home state, or education? We’d better, because
without broad public support climate policies are going nowhere.
We should pay attention to Trump’s propaganda, there are lessons
for us all there.’
